Pittsburgh Plate Glass, supra, 360 U.S. at 404, 79 S. Ct. at 1243 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice BLACKMUN, Justice STEVENS, and Justice GINSBURG join, concurring in the judgment. The need to protect these named witnesses gave rise to the court's conclusion that they were entitled to use the transcripts of their own grand jury testimony to prepare written comments in response to the Counsel's report. This asymmetry in access to information is built into our criminal justice system and represents a justifiable balance between the competing interests of the accused and the public.
. 490, 492-493, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam ). 1060, 1069, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion), we are reluctant to do so when the issue is one of first impression involving the interpretation of a federal statute on which the Department of Justice expressly declines to take a position. Section 3501 of Title 18 seems to provide for that standard in federal criminal prosecutions today. " held "not . 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (holding they are not). at 295, 880 F.2d at 1368, the court buttressed its conclusion by stating that the particularized need standard relevant to requests made pursuant to judicial proceedings had been satisfied in any event. Const., Amdt. We do not perceive in this request any cognizable interest in avoiding a possible injustice as required under Alexander, supra. 512 U.S. 452 114 S.Ct. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L. Ed.
6; Super.Ct.Crim.R. While it is obvious that "in comparison with the right of the defendant and third parties, the right of the government to see and use the grand jury minutes is incomparably the greatest," 1 M. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 6:123 (2d ed. Even putting aside that the particular statement in that case was not entirely clear (the highest court to address the question described it as "equivocal," see State v. Edwards, 122 Ariz. 206, 211, 594 P.2d 72, 76 (1979); see also 451 U.S., at 480, n. 6, 101 S.Ct., at 1882, n. 6), Edwards no more decided the legal consequences of a less than "clear" statement than Miranda, by saying that explicit waivers are sufficient, 384 U.S., at 475, 86 S.Ct., at 1628, settled whether they are necessary. . denied, 464 U.S. 972, 104 S. Ct. 409, 78 L. Ed. .
We decline petitioner's invitation to extend Edwards and require law enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. 2d 89 (1983); United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir.1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. The evidence presented at trial showed that the fifteen-year-old victim in this case was walking home unaccompanied from a bus stop at 11:00 p.m., when a man placed a gun to her back and forced her to walk with him. [20] In Alexander the defendant's motion to compel disclosure of the transcripts stated that "the grand jury testimony was required `to adequately prepare the [defendant's] daughters [third parties] to become witnesses at trial.'" See Wiggins, supra. Indeed, it is easy, amidst the discussion of layers of protection, to lose sight of a real risk in the majority's approach, going close to the core of what the Court has held that the Fifth Amendment provides. But we are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer. We're hosting a symposium on the jurisprudence of the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. Thus, Rule 16 represents a considered balance between the interests of the accused and the state. 2350129 L.Ed.2d 362, Robert L. DAVIS, Petitionerv.UNITED STATES.
1761, 1764, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966); and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament that the ability to speak assertively will abandon them.4 Indeed, the awareness of just these realities has, in the past, dissuaded the Court from placing any burden of clarity upon individuals in custody, but has led it instead to require that requests for counsel be "give[n] a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation," see Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633, 106 S.Ct. Extending Edwards to create such a requirement would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate investigative activity by needlessly preventing the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of an attorney, even if the suspect does not wish to have one present. . Practically, many suspects are going to be understandably nervous and may want to remain respectful to the police. Id. D.C.Code § 17-305(a); see also Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364-65 (D.C. 1979); cf., e.g., Slye v. United States, 602 A.2d 135, 139 (D.C.1992) ("trial court's determination of the degree of negligence involved in the loss of a [Jencks Act] statement is a finding of fact and cannot be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous"). Later, when presented with a photographic array, the victim identified a photograph of appellant as her assailant. "[A]t any stage" obviously includes the stage after initial waiver and the commencement of questioning, and "indicates in any manner" is a rule plainly in tension with the indication "with a vengeance," see id., at 505, 86 S.Ct., at 1644 (Harlan, J., dissenting) that the Court would require for exercise of the "continuous" right at some point after initial waiver. See Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. Further, we note that this court accords the trial court broader discretion to apply no sanction at all where the loss of evidence "is the result of no bad faith on the part of the government."
A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted. A military judge denied his motion to suppress statements made at the interview, holding that his mention of a lawyer during the interrogation was not a request for counsel. The agents also learned that only privately owned pool cues could be removed from the club premises, and that petitioner owned two cues — one of which had a bloodstain on it. FACTS: D spent an evening shooting pool with another sailor who owed him money The other sailor's body … Continue reading "Davis v. United States" If we were to view the request for disclosure as emanating from appellant, this case would be indistinguishable from Alexander and our analysis unnecessary. There is no excuse for this. 1986) ("The principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy"). Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. Ms. Mosby's friend, Wilmore Blakeney, testified that he went to appellant's family's new residence that evening at around 10:45 p.m. to deliver something to Ms. Mosby. 6. The Court defends as tolerable the certainty that some poorly expressed requests for counsel will be disregarded on the ground that Miranda warnings suffice to alleviate the inherent coercion of the custodial interrogation. Clarifying questions help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the suspect's statement regarding counsel. In the midst of his questioning by naval investigators, petitioner said "maybe I should talk to a lawyer." 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), where we noted that the "likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present" was not dispositive.
The other justifications offered for the "requisite level of clarity" rule, ante, at ____, are that, whatever its costs, it will further society's strong interest in "effective law enforcement," ante, at ____, and maintain the "ease of application," id., at ____, that has long been a concern of our Miranda jurisprudence. While it is plainly wrong, for example, to continue interrogation when the suspect wants it to stop (and so indicates), the strong bias in favor of individual choice may also be disserved by stopping questioning when a suspect wants it to continue (but where his statement might be understood otherwise), see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109, 96 S.Ct. Page 452 512 U.S. 452 (1994) 114 S.Ct. Subscribe to Justia's Free Newsletters featuring summaries of federal and state court opinions. When he was finished, he forced her to accompany him to the upper floor of the house, where he retrieved some mail from a window sill. The right to counsel recognized in Miranda is sufficiently important to suspects in criminal investigations, we have held, that it "requir[es] the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard." It did not raise § 3501(a) below and asserted that it is "not at issue" here, Brief for United States 18, n. 1968). While it will often be good police practice for officers to clarify whether a suspect making an ambiguous statement really wants an attorney, they are not required to ask clarifying questions. But we were not addressing the degree of clarity required to activate the counsel right (let alone endorsing the standard embraced today), as is evident from the very page of McNeil cited, where we were careful to say only that the Miranda counsel right "requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney." For exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh the rule’s heavy costs. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. [19] Appellant's brief refers to several cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Sealed Motion court, including Bursey v. United States, 466 F. Supp. [11] In support of his misidentification defense, appellant emphasized discrepancies between the victim's description of her assailant and appellant's actual physical characteristics. On November 4, 1988, petitioner was interviewed at the NIS office.
Only then did the interrogation resume (stopping for good when petitioner said, "I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else").
See Tr. On appeal, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review upheld the conviction. Compare Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97, 105 S.Ct. Nor, finally, is it plausible to read Miranda itself as a presage of the Court's rule, on account of language suggesting that questioning need not stop when a request for counsel is " 'indecisive.' 700, 704-05 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (adopting the presumptive right standard of Sealed Motion). Further, some argue (including appellant here) that the policy of grand jury secrecy gives the government an unfair advantage when considered in light of the government's on-going custody of grand jury transcripts. Click here for important resources on the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett and the confirmation process.We're hosting a symposium on the jurisprudence of the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He also admitted that he was one of three family members (all of them male) who had a key to the padlock on the back gate, and that he and his brother had an arrangement whereby they alternated retrieving the mail from their former residence.