1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). Id., at 45-48, 67. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), but contends that rather than apply this standard, the Arizona court applied a "but for" test, under which the court found that but for the promise given by Sarivola, Fulminante would not have confessed. " 161 Ariz. 237, 244, n. 1, 778 P.2d 602, 609, n. 1 (1989). He had been caring for Jeneane while his wife, Jeneane's mother, was in the hospital. ¶ 1 A jury found Defendant Oreste Fulminante guilty of first-degree, premeditated murder. For example, the State introduced evidence that Fulminante knew of Sarivola's connections with organized crime in an attempt to explain why Fulminante would have been motivated to confess to Sarivola in seeking protection. Pp. The Supreme Court of Arizona stated that the trial court committed no error in finding the confession voluntary based on the record before it. While at Ray Brook, he masqueraded as an organized crime figure. 3101, 3106, n. 6, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459, 99 S.Ct. The majority opinion, wrote White, ignores decades of Supreme Court precedent and "is inconsistent with the thesis that ours is not an inquisitorial system of criminal justice." Payne, supra, 356 U.S., at 568, 78 S.Ct., at 850. We have a quite different evaluation of the evidence. On September 4, 1984, Fulminante was indicted in Arizona for the first-degree murder of Jeneane. As to other aspects of the second confession, including Fulminante's motive and state of mind, the only corroborating evidence was the first confession to Anthony Sarivola. 224 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404, 65 S.Ct. 1930, 1936-1937, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978). post, at 7 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. It is clear, though, that in Payne the Court recognized that regardless of the amount of other evidence, "the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment," because "where, as here, a coerced confession constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession." So it's a little short of that. The facts of record in the present case are quite different from those present in cases where we have found confessions to be coerced and involuntary. Chief Justice REHNQUIST, with whom Justice O'CONNOR joins, Justice KENNEDY and Justice SOUTER join as to Parts I and II, and Justice SCALIA joins as to Parts II and III, delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II, and a dissenting opinion with respect to Parts I and III. 2941, 2957, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987); the majority offers no convincing reason for overturning our long line of decisions requiring the exclusion of coerced confessions. Indeed, the fact that the sentencing judge focused on the similarities between the two confessions in determining that they were reliable suggests that either of the confessions alone, even when considered with all the other evidence, would have been insufficient to permit the judge to find an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt as a requisite prelude to imposing the death penalty. CR 142821 (Super. After considering the evidence at trial as well as the stipulated facts before the trial court on the motion to suppress, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the confession was coerced, but initially determined that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless error, because of the overwhelming nature of the evidence against Fulminante. Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S., at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). This view is buttressed by an examination of the opinion in Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. After Fulminante was released from prison, he also confessed to Sarivola's wife, whom he had never met before. Convicted gun-offender Oreste Fulminante feared for his life after rumors that he had murdered his stepdaughter swept Ray Brook federal prison in New York.
749] (impartial judge).". ; Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U. S., at 258. Id., at 173-174. Id., at 262, 778 P.2d, at 627. 1336, 1344, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603-604, 81 S.Ct. 274, 280, 4 L.Ed.2d 242. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. Id., at 88t-88b1. See also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, n. 6 (1986); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483 (1972); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, and n. 8 (1967); Haynes v. Washington, supra, at 518; Blackburn v. Alabama, supra, at 206; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63 (1951); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597, n. 1 (1944). Id., at 262, 778 P.2d, at 627.2. [n.1] After considering the evidence at trial as well as the stipulated facts before the trial court on the motion to suppress, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the confession was coerced, but initially determined that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless error, because of the overwhelming nature of the evidence against Fulminante. Moreover, cases since Chapman have reiterated the rule that using a defendant's coerced confession against him is a denial of due process of law regardless of the other evidence in the record aside from the confession.
13703(B) (1989). Although she testified that she was "disgusted" by Fulmin ante's disclosures, id., at 169, she stated that she took no steps to notify authorities of what she had learned.
Cf. 1918, 1921-1923, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of the offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. Stare decisis is "of fundamental importance to the rule of law," Welch v. Texas Dept. Dept., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987); the majority offers no convincing reason for overturning our long line of decisions requiring the exclusion of coerced confessions. For instance, we have previously held that the admission of a defendant's statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment is subject to harmless-error analysis. There are additional facts in the record, not relied upon by the Arizona Supreme Court, which also support a finding of coercion. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53, 90 S.Ct. CR 142821, supra, at 3. The State introduced both confessions as evidence at trial, and on December 19, 1985, Fulminante was convicted of Jeneane's murder. 445, 449, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985).
See Whorton, supra, at 789; Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488-490 (1978). Prior to trial, Fulminante moved to suppress the statement he had given Sarivola in prison, as well as a second confession he had given to Donna Sarivola, then Anthony Sarivola's fiancee and later his wife, following his May 1984 release from prison. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S., at 139-140, 88 S.Ct., at 1630 (White, J., dissenting). Id., at 90-92. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S., at 587, 106 S.Ct., at 3111 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The admission of an involuntary confession is a "trial error," similar in both degree and kind to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence. § 13-703(B) (1989). But it overturned the trial court's finding of voluntariness based on the more comprehensive trial record before it, which included, in addition to the facts stipulated at the suppression hearing, a statement made by Sarivola at the trial that "the defendant had been receiving 'rough treatment from the guys, and if the defendant would tell the truth, he could be protected.' 619, 623, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, and n. 8, 87 S.Ct. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110, 106 S.Ct. This reflects the "strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will," Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S., at 206-207, 80 S.Ct., at 279-280, as well as "the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves," Spano, supra, 360 U.S., at 320-321, 79 S.Ct., at 1205-1206. For example, we have held susceptible to harmless-error analysis the failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 99 S.Ct. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The court therefore reversed the conviction and ordered that Fulminante be retried without the use of the confession to Sarivola. The jurors could also have believed that Donna Sarivola had a motive to lie about the confession in order to assist her husband. If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on that evidence alone, without careful consideration of the other evidence in the case. Id., at 186-188. ; Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S., at 258, 108 S.Ct., at 1798. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 [65 S.Ct. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. . 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1, and those elicited in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, since both confessions have the same evidentiary impact and may have been elicited by equally egregious conduct. The State Supreme Court properly concluded that Fulminante's confession was coerced. First, some coerced confessions may be untrustworthy.
We have also held that the admission of an out-of-court statement by a nontestifying codefendant is subject to harmless-error analysis. In support of this argument, the State points to the Arizona court's reference to Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The inadmissible confession to Anthony Sarivola was itself subject to serious challenge. 161, 66 L.Ed.2d 76 (1980). Id., at 262, 778 P.2d, at 627. Each of these constitutional deprivations is a similar structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself. In applying the totality of the circumstances test to determine that the confession to Sarivola was coerced, the Arizona Supreme Court focused on a number of relevant facts. No. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323, 79 S.Ct. She had been shot twice in the head at close range with a large caliber weapon, and a ligature was around her neck. * Early in the morning of September 14, 1982, Fulminante called the Mesa, Arizona, Police Department to report that his 11-year-old stepdaughter, Jeneane Michelle Hunt, was missing. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. The two men came to spend several hours a day together. Last week a sharply divided Supreme Court overturned that verdict, ruling that the government had used Fulminante's fear of physical harm to unlawfully coerce a confession.
In reaching this conclusion, the judge relied heavily on evidence concerning the manner of the killing and Fulminante's motives and state of mind which could only be found in the two confessions. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (same). Id., at 114, 129-131. Id., at 174-175. Id., at 262, 778 P. 2d, at 627.