44–46. Emphasizing the concerns with parallel litigation and conflicting judgments just discussed, see id., at 484–486, the Court in Heck held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a plaintiff in a §1983 action first had to prove that his conviction had been invalidated in some way, id., at 486. See, e.g., id., at 388–391, and n. 3; Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 360 (2005). Shortly after his arrest for armed robbery, petitioner was taken to an interrogation room and read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. With respect to a conventional criminal statute, if a State declared that its goal was "treatment" and "rehabilitation," it is obvious that the Fifth Amendment would still apply. The principles and reasoning of Heck—which emphasized those concerns with parallel litigation and conflicting judgments—confirm the strength of this analogy. An accused's postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast doubt upon the clarity of his initial request for counsel. Petitioner did not testify or offer other evidence at the trial. Relying on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the court held that the trial court had improperly relied upon testimony obtained in violation of petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination. Such a rule would create practical problems in jurisdictions where prosecutions regularly last nearly as long as—or even longer than—the relevant civil limitations period.
441 372 The privilege against self-incrimination enjoined by the Fifth Amendment is not designed to enhance the reliability of the factfinding determination; it stands in the Constitution for entirely independent reasons. fortify the conclusion, based on ordinary observation of human conduct, that under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective mentality or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt. Stat., ch. On occasion, an accused's asserted request for counsel may be ambiguous or equivocal. U.S. 979 If the date of the favorable termination was relevant in Heck, it is relevant here.
Smith’s counterarguments do not sway the result.
However, rather than terminate the interrogation to meet petitioner's request, the interrogating officers continued the interrogation; ultimately, he made incriminating statements.
Nor can the fact that proof of sexual dangerousness requires evidence of noncriminal elements - the continuing requirement that a future criminal "propensity" be proved, for instance - prevent the applicability of the Fifth Amendment; if anything, that requirement should be the subject of greater, rather than lesser, concern.
Id., at 936. 4 Minnesota v. Murphy, 1984), ORTIZ v. GEN. MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORP., (N.D.Ill.
Id., at 487. See n. 2, supra.
.
That rule would create practical problems in jurisdictions where prosecutions regularly last nearly as long as—or even longer than—the limitations period. State v. Smith. I therefore respectfully dissent. Under the Act, the State has a statutory obligation to provide "care and treatment for [persons adjudged sexually dangerous] designed to effect recovery," § 105-8, in a facility set aside to provide psychiatric care, ibid. . 102 Ill.2d 365, 373-374, 466 N.E.2d 236, 240 (1984). When McDonough would not, Smith allegedly fabricated evidence in order to inculpate him. He contends that the police improperly elicited a confession from him after he clearly had requested the assistance of counsel, and that, the trial court's refusal to suppress the confession therefore violated. (1967), petitioner also urges that the proceedings in question are "criminal" because a person adjudged sexually dangerous under the Act is committed for an indeterminate period to the Menard Psychiatric Center, a maximum-security institution that is run by the Illinois Department of Corrections and that houses convicts needing psychiatric care as well as sexually dangerous persons.
The soundness of this conclusion is reinforced by the consequences that would follow from the Second Circuit’s approach, which would impose a ticking limitations clock on criminal defendants as soon as they become aware that fabricated evidence has been used against them.
McDonough also contends that his suit is timely because he suffered a continuing constitutional violation, but this argument is similarly difficult to evaluate without identifying precisely what that violation was. First, Gault's sweeping statement that "our Constitution guarantees that no person shall be `compelled' to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of his liberty," id., at 50, is plainly not good law. 425
The conviction was affirmed by both the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that petitioner's subsequent responses to continued police questioning rendered his initial request for counsel "ambiguous" and that the officers therefore were not required to terminate their questioning. Cf. Tellingly, Smith has not suggested an alternative common-law analogy. As noted above, this Court often decides accrual questions by referring to the common-law principles governing analogous torts. Once you create your profile, you will be able to: Claim the judgments where you have appeared by linking them directly to your profile and maintain a record of your body of work.
Ibid. [478
490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. STEVEN SMITH, Appellant. at 377, 466 N.E.2d at 242. Third, Smith argues that the advantages of his rule outweigh its disadvantages as a matter of policy.
1 See Floyd v.Attorney General of Pa., 722 Fed.
] "It has long been recognized that the eliciting and use of confessions or admissions require careful scrutiny. Please try again. The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District reversed, over one dissent. A. Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what, really. As the Supreme Court of Illinois and the State have both pointed out, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how requiring the privilege against self-incrimination in these proceedings would in any way advance reliability. BANK TRUST, (N.D.Ill.
11–15. 107 Ill. 2d, at 102-103, 481 N. E. 2d, at 696. 2. 266 Third and finally, Smith argues that the advantages of his rule outweigh its disadvantages as a matter of policy. : 84-5332 DECIDED BY: Burger Court (1981-1986) LOWER COURT: Supreme Court of Illinois CITATION: 469 US 91 (1984) DECIDED: Dec 10, 1984 Notes. . Illinois."
.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. Whatever its label and whatever the State's alleged purpose, petitioner argues, such commitment is the sort of punishment - total deprivation of liberty in a criminal setting - that Gault teaches cannot be imposed absent application of the privilege against self-incrimination.
At the bench trial on the petition, the State presented the testimony of the two examining psychiatrists, over petitioner's objection that they had elicited information from him in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination.
AUTH., (N.D.Ill. Based upon the testimony of the psychiatrists, as well as that of the victim of the sexual assault for which petitioner had been indicted, the trial court found petitioner to be a sexually dangerous person under the Act. ReDiaz, Subscribe to Cases that cite 469 U. S. 91, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE.
But the record here tells us little or nothing about the regimen at the psychiatric center, and it certainly
THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. I'd like to do that."
He again presented the allegedly fabricated testimony during this trial, which lasted more than a month and ended in a mistrial.
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
We hold that the limitations period did not begin to run until McDonough’s acquittal, and therefore reverse. [478 Illinois' civil commitment procedure expressly protects the individual's right to silence.
McDonough therefore had a complete and present cause of action for the loss of his liberty only once the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor. The criminal procedure for compulsory confinement is applicable to those who have been accused of a criminal offense, and whose mental health is called into question. Creating your profile on CaseMine allows you to build your network with fellow lawyers and prospective clients.
Wallace held that the limitations period begins to run on a §1983 claim alleging an unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment as soon as the arrestee “becomes detained pursuant to legal process,” not when he is ultimately released. Second, Smith notes (1) that a fabricated-evidence claim in the Second Circuit (unlike a malicious prosecution claim) can exist even if there is probable cause and (2) that McDonough was acquitted.
Dec. 10, 1984. CitationState v. Smith, 80 Ohio St. 3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997 Ohio LEXIS 2461, 1997-Ohio-355 (Ohio Oct. 15, 1997) Brief Fact Summary.
387 See Tr. It is the substance of the Illinois procedure, rather than its title, that is relevant to our inquiry.
As Justice Simon noted in his dissent below, "with the possible exception of the word `uh' the defendant's statement in this case was neither indecisive nor ambiguous: `Uh, yeah, I'd like to do that. The Act thus does not appear to promote either of "the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence." . He contends that the police improperly elicited a confession from him after he clearly had requested the assistance of counsel, and that the trial court's refusal to suppress the confession therefore violated Miranda v.
To the extent Smith argues that the law in this area should take account of prosecutors’ broad discretion over such matters as the terms on which pleas will be offered or whether charges will be dropped, those arguments more properly bear on the question whether a given resolution should be understood as favorable or not.
The second trial also lasted over a month, and again, Smith elicited allegedly fabricated testimony.
5 Smith urges the Court to steer away from the comparison to malicious prosecution, noting that the Second Circuit treats malicious prosecution claims and fabricated-evidence claims as distinct. Ante, at 9. psychiatrists' reports in this very case suggests the propriety of that concern.
Q.
1940)). U.S. 364, 372] at 369, 466 N.E.2d at 238 (emphasis in opinion) (bracketed words appear in Tr.
See Wallace, 549 U. S., at 389. 2011) (Dobbs). No. Indeterminate commitment would derive from proven violations of criminal statutes, combined with findings of mental disorders and "criminal propensities," and constitutional protections for criminal defendants would be simply inapplicable. Shortly after his arrest for armed robbery, petitioner was taken to an interrogation room and read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. Pp.
McDonough has not fully explained the difference between that claim and his fabrication claim, which he insists is both analogous to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution and distinct from his dismissed malicious-prosecution claim. Neither circumstance pertains here, however.
409
(1972), we referred to the potentially indefinite commitment to the "sex deviate facility" located in the Wisconsin State Prison, id., at 506, as "a massive curtailment of liberty." 493] consult with an attorney before speaking").
It seems quite clear to me, in view of the consequences of conviction and the heavy reliance on the criminal justice system - for its definition of the prohibited conduct, for the discretion of the prosecutor, for the standard of proof, and for the Director of Corrections as custodian - that the proceeding must be considered "criminal" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.