The Court of Appeals, moreover, faulted the District Court for failing to "consider the wider context." 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he defendant's own confession [is] probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him." § 52(2) ("The term `kickback' means any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or compensation of any kind which is provided, directly or indirectly, to [enumerated persons] for the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding favorable treatment in connection with [enumerated circumstances]. Finally, and of prime significance, Skilling's jury acquitted him of nine insider-trading counts. 1507. See, e.g., Von Barta, supra, at 1006 (collecting cases); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (C.A.7 1973). Id., at 560.
Not at all. "Q. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600. Id., at 725-726, 81 S.Ct. Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.
Ibid. Id., at 12067. [2][3], United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, "Justices Limit Use of 'Honest Services' Law Against Fraud", "Former Juneau lawmaker fined $18K for allegedly helping oil companies while seeking oil jobs", "Corruption case against former Alaska legislator crumbled", Lawyers prepare to reopen 'honest services' cases in wake of Supreme Court ruling, Honest-Services Fraud: The Supreme Court Defuses the Government's Weapon of Mass Discretion in Skilling v. United States, Supreme Court Limits Scope of “Honest Services” Statute - Skilling v. United States, Justice Department Seeks a Broader Fraud Law to Cover Self-Dealing, http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol44/iss3/19, Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Federal prosecution of public corruption in the United States, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Skilling_v._United_States&oldid=969042119, United States Sixth Amendment jury case law, United States Supreme Court cases of the Roberts Court, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, Pretrial publicity and community prejudice did not prevent Skilling from obtaining a fair trial.
The company's stock, which had traded at $90 per share in August 2000, plummeted to pennies per share in late 2001. The court also allotted the defendants jointly 14 peremptory challenges, 2 more than the standard number prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b)(2) and (c)(4)(B). 483 U.S., at 352-353, 360, 107 S.Ct. "Q. 2031. No meaningful information about his knowledge or attitudes was obtained. "This interpretive guide is especially appropriate in construing [§ 1346] because ... mail [and wire] fraud [are] predicate offense[s] under [the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act], 18 U.S.C. While many of the stories were straightforward news items, many others conveyed and amplified the community's outrage at the top executives perceived to be responsible for the company's bankruptcy. 843a. Even if that conclusion followed from its premises, it would not suffice to eliminate the vagueness of the statute. App. 3 Supp. 1639. In urging invalidation of § 1346, Skilling swims against our case law's current, which requires us, if we can, to construe, not condemn, Congress' enactments. In fact, the court asked very few prospective jurors any questions directed to their knowledge of or feelings about that event.14 Considering how much news the plea generated, many more than two venire members were likely aware of it. The court then permitted each side to pose follow-up questions. 888 (1939), nor by judicial construction that writes in specific criteria that its text does not contain, see United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 219-221, 23 S.Ct. App. Id., at 429, 111 S.Ct. 527, 53 S.Ct. 1639. But we disagree with the Fifth Circuit's honest-services ruling. 1639. Id., at 999a. See id., at 352-353, 107 S.Ct. 971a (Juror 84) (had not heard or read anything about Enron and said she did not "know enough to answer" the question whether she was angry about the company's demise). Having not "pa[id] much attention" to Enron-related news, she "quite honestly" did not "have enough information to know" whether Skilling was probably guilty, id., at 873a, and she "th[ought] [she] could be" fair and impartial, id., at 875a. But she ultimately agreed that she would be able to presume innocence. Because petitioner, in my view, is not entitled to a reversal of the decision below on the jury-trial question that is before us, I join the judgment of the Court in full. See, e.g., Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. Such jurors may well acquit where evidence is wholly lacking, while subconsciously resolving closer calls against the defendant rather than giving him the benefit of the doubt. Here there is no choice to be made between two "fair alternatives." We agree with the Court of Appeals that "[t]he express finding that Juror 11 was fair is not reversible error." Addressing them as a group, the District Court began by briefly describing the case and providing a standard admonition about the need to be fair and impartial and to decide the case based solely on the trial evidence and jury instructions. Approximately 160 prospective jurors appeared for voir dire at a federal courthouse located "about six blocks from Enron's former headquarters." 177, 81 S.Ct. While the offender profited, the betrayed party suffered no deprivation of money or property; instead, a third party, who had not been deceived, provided the enrichment. Id., at 931a. App. Until today, no one has thought (and there is no basis for thinking) that the honest-services statute prohibited only bribery and kickbacks. Of the 12 persons who served on the jury, "8 had at one time or another read or heard something about the case. The Court found the statute vague, meaning it was written in a manner that almost anyone could be convicted of the statute by engaging in most legal activities. The District Court again declined to move the trial. 08-1196, pp. 28-29. Only two venire members recalled the plea; neither mentioned Causey by name, and neither ultimately served on Skilling's jury. Even if these extraordinary circumstances did not constitutionally compel a change of venue, they required the District Court to conduct a thorough voir dire in which prospective jurors' attitudes about the case were closely scrutinized. "Jurors," we have recognized, "cannot be expected invariably to express themselves carefully or even consistently."
Moreover, the court noted, Skilling had challenged only one seated juror—Juror 11—for cause. Mu'Min, 500 U.S., at 428, 111 S.Ct. I don't really know much about it. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798-799, 95 S.Ct. Juror 10, for instance, reported on his written questionnaire that he knew several co-workers who owned Enron stock; that he personally may have owned Enron stock through a mutual fund; that he heard and read about the Enron cases from the "Houston Chronicle, all three Houston news channels, Fox news, talking with friends [and] co-workers, [and] Texas Lawyer Magazine"; that he believed Enron's collapse "was due to greed and mismanagement"; that "[i]f [Lay] did not know what was going on in his company, he was really a poor manager/leader"; and that the defendants were "suspect." Yet she was clearly aware of some specifics. § 1341 (emphasis added); see id., at 357-358, 107 S.Ct. In all, the court granted one of the Government's for-cause challenges and denied four; it granted three of the defendants' challenges and denied six. 365. The prejudice that may deny a fair trial is not limited to a bias or discriminatory attitude. These three defendants, the indictment alleged. 1899 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) ("Our willingness to accord substantial deference to a trial court's finding of juror impartiality rests on our expectation that the trial court will conduct a sufficient voir dire to determine the credibility of a juror professing to be impartial"). Enacted in 1872, the original mail-fraud provision, the predecessor of the modern-day mail- and wire-fraud laws, proscribed, without further elaboration, use of the mails to advance "any scheme or artifice to defraud." I don't know. Ante, at 2919-2920, and n. 26.21 In context, however, these general declarations reveal little about the seated jurors' actual knowledge or views or the possible pressure they might have felt to convict, and thus cannot instill confidence that the jurors "were not under [the] sway" of the prevailing community sentiment. Finally, after the venire member stepped away, the court entertained and ruled on challenges for cause.
The level of public animus toward Skilling dwarfed that present in cases such as Murphy and Mu'Min. The District Court first emphasized to the venire the importance of impartiality and explained the presumption of innocence and the Government's burden of proof. Supreme Court of United States.https://leagle.com/images/logo.png.