The Court then noted that Barrett's limited requests for counsel were accompanied by affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak with the authorities. We now turn to the question when the right to consult counsel is waived. The present state of the law seems to be that a defendant in such a case is best served if he responds to prearrest questioning, because doing so immunizes him from later effectively waiving his Miranda rights. On remand, defendant argues that, although the second confession does not violate the federal constitution, we should apply a stricter standard under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant was entitled to pick and choose what he wished to talk about. Defendant was then informed for the first time of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 85, 672 P.2d 1182 (1983), as requiring Miranda warnings under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. 635, 640, 596 P.2d 572 (1979), rev'd 288 Or. Where respondent, in response to a police officer's request voluntarily came to a police station for questioning about a burglary and was immediately informed that he was not under arrest, and, at the close of a half-hour interview, left the station … We did so because we did not believe that the alternative warnings were a sufficient improvement to justify a variation from the federal rule "[a]t least as long as the text of the federal Miranda *337 warnings remains the law." Atty. In determining whether it has been dissipated, lapse of time and change of place from the original surroundings are the most important considerations.
Defendant at time of trial asserted violation of both state and federal constitutional rights and in his brief to the Court of Appeals incorporated his trial court objection in addition to requesting the appellate court to adopt the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder. 231, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979). 1654 (1947)), but mere age does not make it worthy. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L. Ed. Oct 3, 1984. 2d at 928. With her on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. After listening to the tapes, aided by a transcript, the trial court ruled: With regard to the second invocation by defendant of his right to counsel, the trial court ruled that this was an effective invocation of the right. ORS 163.095(2)(c). 83-773.
*553 Stephen J. Williams, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant.
Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at ___, 105 S. Ct. at 1293, 84 L. Ed. Suppressing postwarning statements under such circumstances would serve “neither the …
2d at 496. There, the initial confession was inadmissible because the interrogating officers persisted in questioning the defendant after he indicated that he did not want to talk and wanted a lawyer, circumstances that, the court noted, made the initial confession "partake more of actual coercion." Gary D. … Uncorroborated accomplice testimony is not inadmissible. Advocates. The Supreme Court held that Smith had unambiguously expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel and therefore was not subject to further interrogation by the authorities, citing Edwards.
Our inquiry here is whether there was a sufficient break in the stream of events between that inadmissible statement and the written confession to insulate the latter statement from the effect of what went before. 2d at 232. Decided by Burger Court . Stephen F. Peifer, Asst. [2] We are agreed, however, that, Miranda questions aside, once a suspect in custody unequivocally requests to talk to a lawyer, that request must be granted and questioning should cease. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession.
First, it describes the circumstances leading up to the initial confession in Hibdon as involving "significant elements of threat and compulsion" in that the officer pointed his gun at the defendant and told him to "come out or be shot," whereas this case involves no such threat or compulsion but "just a procedural failure to give Miranda warnings." v. 2d 222 (1985), Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, reiterated that prophylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected, citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2363, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1974), and Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 492, 101 S. Ct. at 1888 (Powell, J., concurring). He gave an oral confession; it was typewritten by McAllister as it was spoken. Interpretation of Oregon statutes and the Oregon Constitution is the responsibility of this court. That statement may not literally have admitted complicity in the burglary, but given the manner in which the questioning officer put the inquiry, indicating that he felt defendant was "involved" in the burglary, defendant's affirmative response was significantly inculpatory. Upon reconvening the conversation, they again advised defendant of his Miranda rights.
App. 409, 657 P.2d 227 (1983) and State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. Kell and White, along with Barbara Harris, the decedent's wife, were indicted for aggravated murder. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, reflects a balanced and pragmatic approach to enforcing the Miranda warning. From a procedural point of view, in deciding whether any state statute or Article I, section 11 or 12, of the Oregon Constitution has been violated, our first step is not to match up interpretation of our state laws and constitution with federal law or the federal constitution on the issue whether this defendant waived his right against self-incrimination by agreeing with the police to speak on certain aspects of a crime but not others. The preliminary discussion concerned defendant's early life, employment, family, residences and the like. 2d 694 (1966). He was questioned without the benefit of Miranda warnings. 2d 441 (1963). He was questioned by two detectives from the Springfield Police Department at the Santa *335 Barbara jail. 5, 1984) Brief Fact Summary. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. [1] We decline to do so and affirm defendant's conviction for first degree burglary. at 70, 602 P.2d 272. Citation 470 US 298 (1985) Argued. We do not imply that all future elaborations or changes of the analysis by the United States Supreme Court also will apply to a claim under Oregon law. Both of those considerations are present in this case. at 71, 602 P.2d 272. When officers of the Polk County, Ore., Sheriff's Office picked up respondent at his home as a suspect in a burglary, he made an incriminating statement without having been given the warnings required by Miranda v. 2d 920 (1987), addressed the problem created when a person being interrogated in custody states that he would not make a written statement outside the presence of counsel but is willing to admit orally his involvement in a crime.
STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Michael James ELSTAD, Appellant. App. In other words, can there be a partial waiver of the right against self-incrimination? 2d 410, 421 (1986), Justice O'Connor, again writing for the majority, stated that the waiver of rights conveyed in the Miranda warnings involves an inquiry of two distinct dimensions: Chief Justice Rehnquist in Connecticut v. Barrett, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 828, 93 L. Ed. To conclude that respondent invoked his right to counsel for all purposes requires not a broad interpretation of an ambiguous statement, but a disregard of the ordinary meaning of respondent's statement." We respectfully disagree. We note that there was no interrogation by the police following defendant's first statement of interest in an attorney. Oral Argument - October 03, 1984; Opinions.
She wrote: She then addressed the waiver issue, stating: In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. ___, ___, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L. Ed. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1980), that police officers had no authority to prevent or delay communication between an arrested person and a lawyer, but that an arrested person, not yet indicted or formally charged with a crime, can voluntarily waive consultation with counsel and make voluntary statements which will be admissible against him. Defendant acknowledged understanding each of his rights and consented to talk to police. The facts of the present case simply do not fit Edwards, which was and is good federal law and is equally applicable to Article I, sections 11 and 12, of the Oregon *340 Constitution. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) Oregon v. Elstad. Later in the conversation the Springfield police officers took a break. The Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of conviction is reinstated. Defendant does not assign as error the trial court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal. 470 U.S. 298. 83-773 . Atty. [2] In determining whether a confession is the fruit of a prior illegal arrest, the flagrancy of the police misconduct in making the arrest is a factor to be considered. Both officers stayed in the bedroom while defendant dressed. In State v. Mendacino, supra, the court stated that an interval of seventy-two hours might be adequate insulation, but was not in that case, given other factors, including that the defendant remained in *555 custody without an opportunity to consult an attorney and that the same two officers who had elicited the original confessions were present at the subsequent interrogation. Further, in this case, defendant states in his response to this court's question concerning waiver that "all that defendant asked in this case was the adoption of the Edwards rule under the Oregon Constitution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals stated that defendant asserted violation solely of his right to be free from self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution and that he made no separate claim under the federal constitution.
Under either constitution, therefore, federal constitutional analysis is applicable." The state here attempts to distinguish Hibdon in two ways. 1. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. CitationOregon v. Elstad, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 1317, 465 U.S. 1078, 104 S. Ct. 1437, 79 L. Ed. Media. In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 105 S. Ct. 490, 83 L. Ed. [2] In State v. Smith, 301 Or. 2d 423 (1967); State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. On December 17, 1981, officers McAllister and Burke went to defendant's home with a warrant for his arrest. Id., at ___, 107 S. Ct. at 832, 93 L. Ed. The full confession was made less than one hour after the prior statement. Syllabus ; View Case ; Petitioner Oregon .
Harris died as the result of a dynamite explosion. The Court also noted that police officers were ill-equipped to determine when "custody" legally begins. The question in this case is not whether Miranda warnings should be given, but what the police may do when a suspect in custody requests to consult a lawyer. During that part of the interview, the following conversation took place: At trial defendant sought to prevent the introduction of the tape recordings into evidence. The state does not dispute that the statement elicited from defendant at his home *554 was inadmissible. Burke, McAllister and defendant were the only persons present when the confession was given. That the officer's statement provoked a response in which defendant apparently agreed to keep talking * * *." Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries 199, 712 P.2d 827 (1986). He then signed the two-page confession which is the subject of his motion to suppress. Kell was arrested on the warrant in Santa Barbara, California, and held there for Springfield, Oregon, police. Was Elstad's written confession made invalid by the failure of the officers to administer Miranda warnings at his home? State v. Smith, 301 Or. Lower court State appellate court . State v. Elstad - 658 P.2d 552. It must be remembered that Edwards, after first waiving his Miranda rights during interrogation discussing a possible "deal," said, "I want an attorney before making a deal." In State v. Hibdon, 57 Or.