Fifth Amendment rules “must be consistent with … practical realities,” Roberson, 486 U. S., at 688 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and the reality is that police may operate within the confines of the Shatzer was surprised because he thought that the investigation had been closed, but Hoover explained they had opened a new file. Likewise, no one questions that Shatzer triggered the Edwards protections when, according to Detective Blankenship’s notes of the 2003 interview, he stated that “ ‘he would not talk about this case without having an attorney present,’ ” 405 Md., at 589, 954 A. . Miranda But once the suspect has been out of custody long enough (14 days) to eliminate its coercive effect, there will be nothing to gain by such gamesmanship—nothing, that is, except the entirely appropriate gain of being able to interrogate a suspect who has made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. Falcon Heights, Faribault, Farmington, Forest Lake. In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966) , the Court adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right from the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation. Everyone's Place for Police Related Case Law, Copyright © 2003-2020 [Case Law 4 Cops]. See Paul, Minnesota, mith.com(B) 612.217.0077 (C) 651.280.9533 (F), Contact Me: FB - Twitter - LinkedIn - (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). Shatzer initially waived his Miranda rights but afterwards demanded an attorney, at which point Blankenship ended the interview. At no point during the interrogation did Shatzer request to speak with an attorney or refer to his prior refusal to answer questions without one.
Minnick was arrested by local police and taken to the San Diego jail, where two FBI agents interrogated him the next morning until he requested counsel. , Roberson In Edwards , the Court determined that Zerbst ’s traditional standard for waiver was not sufficient to protect a suspect’s right to have counsel present at a subsequent interrogation if he had previously requested counsel; “additional safeguards” were necessary. The protections offered by Miranda , which we have deemed sufficient to ensure that the police respect the suspect’s desire to have an attorney present the first time police interrogate him, adequately ensure that result when a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects. This test, no doubt, is satisfied by all forms of incarceration. Argued October 5, 2009âDecided February 24, 2010. warnings” [He] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” The rationale of. That concern guides our decision today. After the warnings are given, if the suspect indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Our cases make clear, however, that the freedom of movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody. Before the interview ended, Shatzer agreed to Hoover’s request that he submit to a polygraph examination. Shatzer was released back into the general prison population, and the investigation was closed. No one questions that Shatzer was in custody for Miranda purposes during the interviews with Detective Blankenship in 2003 and Detective Hoover in 2006. A different officer interrogated him three days later while he “was still in custody pursuant to the arrest.” Ibid. SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part III. Shatzer’s experience illustrates the vast differences between Miranda custody and incarceration pursuant to conviction.
Their detention, moreover, is relatively disconnected from their prior unwillingness to cooperate in an investigation. That provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody. Thus, they have returned to their normal lives for some time. 2d, at 1120. Syllabus . 2d, at 1131. The attorney , concurring in the judgment. The protections offered by Miranda, which we have deemed sufficient to ensure that the police respect the suspect’s desire to have an attorney present the first time police interrogate him, adequately ensure that result when a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects. Without minimizing the harsh realities of incarceration, we think lawful imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures identified in Miranda. Two years and six months later, the same social worker referred more specific allegations to the department about the same incident involving Shatzer. line of cases is based, see 486 U. S., In conducting its “cost-benefit” analysis, the Court demeans Id., at 149. Pp. With the help of several local officers from numerous cities in the area, as well as FBI agents, the officers cleared about 175 warrants. . Hoover then read Shatzer his Miranda rights and obtained a written waiver on a standard department form. 21âKâ06â37799 (Cir. The issue section includes the dispositive legal issue in the case phrased as a question. See Maryland Div. That assumption would seem reasonable if the Edwards-suspending effect of a termination of custody is rejected. The concurrence’s rule is also entirely unrelated to the existence of a break in custody. Shatzer helps us distinguish and interpret two prior cases: Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477. 498 U. S. 146,
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. He and the social worker interviewed the victim, then eight years old, who described the incident in more detail. Change ), You are commenting using your Facebook account. v. 5 In a country that harbors a large number of repeat offenders, 6 this consequence is disastrous. Confessions obtained after a 2-week break in custody and a waiver of Miranda rights are most unlikely to be compelled, and hence are unreasonably excluded. United States Supreme Court 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) Facts.
An officer has in no sense lied to a suspect when, after advising, as Miranda requires, “You have the right to remain silent, and if you choose to speak you have the right to the presence of an attorney,” he promptly ends the attempted interrogation because the suspect declines to speak without counsel present, and then, two weeks later, reapproaches the suspect and asks, “Are you now willing to speak without a lawyer present?”.
We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2009). See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 7â8); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 349 (1990); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 644, n. 4 (1984). Today in the world of case review we will look at Maryland v. Shatzer.
He has likely been able to seek advice from an attorney, family members, and friends.3 And he knows from his earlier experience that he need only demand counsel to bring the interrogation to a halt; and that investigative custody does not last indefinitely.
The Court therefore superimposed a “second layer of prophylaxis,” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 176 (1991). Without minimizing the harsh realities of incarceration, we think lawful imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures identified in Miranda . See, Interrogated suspects who have previously been convicted of crime live in prison. The implicit assumption, of course, is that the subsequent requests for interrogation pose a significantly greater risk of coercion. , at 26, 7; are able to send and receive mail, id. ibid. Miranda Can a Passenger Be Detained on a Traffic Stop? When they are released back into the general prison population, they return to their accustomed surroundings and daily routineâthey regain the degree of control they had over their lives prior to the interrogation. Id. Blankenship clarified the purpose of his visit, and Shatzer declined to speak without an attorney. Critically, however, a suspect can waive these rights.