761, at 28-38 (filed February 1966). (c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate or other official empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate or other official beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or other officer. Id. 1992) ("a specific illegal activity") (citing cases); United States v. Ladd, 704 F.2d 134, 136 (4th Cir. courts of the several States�. Id. Reliance interests are also an important factor, and rules of criminal procedure do not in general give rise to substantial reliance interests.

The Court thus made clear that while the Constitution does not itself require that any particular measures be taken, nonetheless some measures must be taken that will be adequate for the purpose at hand-here, the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, although we concede that there As we note below, however, see p. 36, infra, it is of significance that the requirements of Miranda have shaped years of police conduct and governed decades of criminal prosecutions. In setting forth the basic rule that a confession "shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given," Section 3501(a) restates the due process "voluntariness" test that governed the admissibility of confessions before this Court decided Miranda. Especially in light of those factors, we do not urge the Court that Miranda be overruled. Pet. Section 3501(b) specifies a list of non-exclusive factors that a judge "shall take into consideration" in making the voluntariness determination, but it provides that "[t]he presence or absence of any of [those factors] need not be conclusive." That judicial experience led the Court to conclude that Fifth Amendment rights in the custodial interrogation setting could not adequately be protected through case-specific adjudication of claims of police coercion, and that procedural safeguards were required. Today's

Weighing those interests is not an easy task. Id. Dickerson confessed The Court thus reasoned that, "[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).

That principle has long been a fundamental feature of our constitutional structure of government. and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. Br. at 151-155. 81. 16 The committee members in the minority agreed that Section 3501 "repeal[ed]" Miranda by making "voluntariness the sole criterion of the admissibility of a confession in a Federal court." custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts�. The government thus concluded that the lower federal courts "may not apply Section 3501 to admit confessions that Miranda would exclude." I am not convinced by petitioner's argument that Miranda should be preserved See S. Rep. No. But no assurance exists that such technological substitutes could provide a suitable replacement for the by-now well-understood Miranda warnings on a large-scale basis. The majority noted that Congress had enacted Section 3501 "with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda," id. As a general matter, however, "cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare." In at least two other places in its opinion, the Court similarly emphasized that any legislative alternative must meet this standard of adequacy.

See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-307 n.1 ("A Miranda violation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements [in the government's case-in-chief]."). App. The inquiry for purposes of stare decisis, however, focuses on changes in circumstance, because the rule of stare decisis would provide little stability if the factual premises of previous decisions were constantly subject to reconsideration, even when the evidence showed no change of circumstance. Instead, the Court invited Congress and the States to develop "their own safeguards" only if they were "fully as effective" as the Miranda rules to "inform[] accused persons of their right of silence and * * * afford[] a continuous opportunity to exercise it." at 56, 170. opposition to the constitution" -- here, assertedly, the dictates of the In sum, the Court in Miranda expressly rested its decision on constitutional grounds, and the Court's continued application of Miranda's requirements to the States and on habeas review cannot be explained on any ground other than that the Court regards those requirements as implementing and effectuating constitutional rights. 1. The court of appeals relied in part on this Court's statements in Miranda itself that it did not intend to create a "constitutional straitjacket" that would preclude any legislative action in this area, 384 U.S. at 467, and that "the Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation," id. decisions I have discussed do not make sense�. L. Rev. The government thus concluded that the lower federal courts "may not apply Section 3501 to admit confessions that Miranda would exclude." The inquiry for purposes of stare decisis, however, focuses on changes in circumstance, because the rule of stare decisis would provide little stability if the factual premises of previous decisions were constantly subject to reconsideration, even when the evidence showed no change of circumstance. 20. it didn�t matter because their conduct met the �totality of the 1a-28a. permanent place in our jurisprudence. In the thirty-three years since that decision was handed down, it has become embedded in the law and refined through the decisions of this Court. 384 U.S. at 479. power we recognized in Marbury will thus permit us, indeed require us, to at 201. According or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not v. Arizona, which held that the App. C.A. (citation omitted). to whom judicial decisions are an unconnected series of judgments that produce 3501 -- is the determination that the Constitution requires the result that the The Court has also recognized a "public safety" exception to Miranda's "prophylactic rule," stressing that a violation of the procedural safeguards of Miranda is not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment. This Court has frequently noted that it is a virtue of Miranda that it provides bright-line rules that can be readily applied by the police and the courts to a large variety of factual circumstances.24 Indeed, even when, as in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court recognized an exception to the Miranda rules for public safety, the Court explained that "the exception will not be difficult for police officers to apply," 467 U.S. at 658, and that "police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively" between questions permitted and prohibited under the exception, id. The underlying due process rule that confessions are inadmissible unless they are found voluntary under the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test remains applicable, even if the Miranda warnings have been administered. Insofar as the government has taken action to foster such a belief in a given case, cf. 113 Cong. "); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986) (describing Miranda as "our interpretation of the Federal Constitution"); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-482 (1981) (describing Miranda as having "determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments[]" required custodial interrogation to be preceded by advice concerning the suspect's rights). He also stated that he stopped the car at Rochester's request, and Rochester put something in the trunk. Judge Michael disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the search warrant was sufficiently particular, but agreed that the evidence seized was nonetheless admissible pursuant to the good-faith exception. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 12. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore. Ibid. In support of its motion, the government submitted the affidavit of Detective Durkin, who was present throughout petitioner's interview. paragon of moderation, since it declines to overrule Miranda v. Arizona.

The majority held that "[Section] 3501, rather than the judicially created rule of Miranda," governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court.
Several agents entered the apartment. The Nevertheless, the issue whether that discretion was properly exercised in this case does not independently merit review. The in this Nation's history, this Court established the sound proposition that Nonetheless, this Court has also frequently stated that Miranda's requirements are based on its power to interpret and apply the Constitution. 11,189 (1968). The Court noted that, while it might not find statements taken without the warnings "to have been involuntary in traditional terms," id. -- the admission at trial of un-Mirandized confessions -- violates the

Ibid. circumstances," they can be "modified"; they assuredly can. Cf. This federal law became an issue in a case in the 1990s: Dickerson v. United States. A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States. The Court acknowledged in Harvey that the rationale of this line of Sixth Amendment decisions based on the rationale underlying Miranda.


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