Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519, 83 S.Ct. Like my Brother White, post, p. 495, I think the rule announced today is most ill-conceived and that it seriously and unjustifiably fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement. I would like to send my condolences to the Escobedo Family. I had always supposed that the whole purpose of a police investigation of a murder was to 'affect' the trial of the murderer, and that it would be only an incompetent, unsuccessful, or corrupt investigation which would not do so. 158. It was given during the course of a perfectly legitimate police investigation of an unsolved murder.
That case adds nothing, therefore, to Crooker. 28 Ill.2d, at 46, 190 N.E.2d, at 827. I do not suggest for a moment that law enforcement will be destroyed by the rule announced today.
1050. His extradition has been requested, but he has Mexican time to serve first for some drug crimes down there. The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances, the refusal by the police to honor petitioner's request to consult with his lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourtee th Amendment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 83 S.Ct. 161—182. We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement. I would not abandon the Court's prior cases defining with some care and analysis the circumstances requiring the presence or aid of counsel and substitute the amorphous and wholly unworkable principle that counsel is constitutionally required whenever he would or could be helpful. 'It is well settled that the duty of constitutional adjudication resting upon this Court requires that the question whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated by admission into evidence of a coerced confession be the subject of an independent determination here, see, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 147—148, 64 S.Ct. ); United States v. Gilboy, 160 F.Supp. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193. I love you K.K.! It does of course put us one step 'ahead' of the English judges who have had the good sense to leave the matter a discretionary one with the trial court.
did he get prison time? He said I couldn't see him because they hadn't completed questioning.
Obviously law enforcement officers can make mistakes and exceed their authority, as today's decision shows that even judges can do, but I ave somewhat more faith than the Court evidently has in the ability and desire of prosecutors and of the power of the appellate courts to discern and correct such violations of the law. See also (1964) Crim.L.Rev. 1461. I was told at Homicide that I couldn't see him and I would have to get a writ of habeas corpus. The court also held, on the authority of this Court's decisions in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 S.Ct. and he said, 'Yes, I will.'
It might be appropriate for a legislature to provide that a suspect should not be consulted during a criminal investigation; that an accused should never be called before a grand jury to answer, even if he wants to, what may well be incriminating questions; and that no person, whether he be a suspect, guilty criminal or innocent bystander, should be put to the ordeal of responding to orderly noncompulsory inquiry by the State. 1139, 86 L.Ed. * * * I waved to him and he waved back and then the door was closed, by one of the officers at Homicide.1 There were four or five officers milling around the Homicide Detail that night. There is testimony by the police that during the interrogation, petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction with no record of previous experience with the police, 'was handcuffed'3 in a standing position and that he 'was nervous, he had circles under his eyes and he was upset' and was 'agitated' because 'he had not slept well in over a week.'. There were several Homicide Detectives around and I talked to them.
Danny Escobedo's conviction was reversed. (1964) Crim.L.Rev. Ibid. I enjoyed working with Danny through the years and will miss his expertise, kindness and spirit. Id., at 182. 792; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. But this worry hardly calls for the broadside the Court has now fired. The lawyer described the ensuing events in the following terms: 'On that day I received a phone call (from 'the mother of another defendant') and pursuant to that phone call I went to the Detective Bureau at 11th and State. After that he made additional statements further implicating himself in the murder plot. There is no such thing a a trial in the Supreme Court. At one point, as previously noted, petitioner and his attorney came into each other's view for a few moments but the attorney was quickly ushered away.
Ex parte Sullivan, D.C., 107 F.Supp. He became a drifter and was often arrested. Please allow 24 hours for your entry to be reviewed for appropriate content. Williams, Questioning by the Police: Some Practical Considerations, (1960) Crim.L.Rev. Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice CLARK and Mr. Justice STEWART join, dissenting. Report of Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (1963), 10—11: 'The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values which it advances depends upon a constant, searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at all stages of the process. See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 Neb.L.Rev. Without informing him of his absolute right to remain silent in the face of this accusation, the police urged him to make a statement.5 As this Court observed many years ago: 'It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position in which the accused was when the statement was made to him that the other suspected person had charged him with crime, the result was to produce upon his mind the fear that, if he remained silent, it would be considered an admission of guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty person, and it cannot be conceived that the converse impression would not also have naturally arisen that, by denying, there was hope of removing the suspicion from himself.'
He again told me I could not. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448, and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 78 S.Ct. I quoted to Captain Flynn the Section of the Criminal Code which allows an attorney the right to see his client.'2. The accused may, of course, intelligently and knowingly waive his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel either at a pretrial stage or at the trial.
We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.
It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.' Escobedo's statements were not compelled and the Court does not hold that they were. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial." God Bless. Hypothetically, if you caught the virus at a trump rally, could you sue the campaign? (Emphasis in original.) In that case a federal grand jury had indicted Massiah. When petitioner requested, and was denied, an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of 'an unsolved crime.' * * * I filed an official complaint with Commissioner Phelan of the Chicago Police Department. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1297, decided by this Court only six years ago. The need for peace and order is too insistent for that. 1202, 1209, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265. May the Lord grant you peace beyond measure, beyond understanding.