In that circumstance, Linkletter held not only that retrospective application of Mapp would not further the goal of deterrence but also that it would not further 'the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process.' The supporting affidavit, which the police had with them when they executed the warrant, and which was attested by the same judge who had issued the warrant, described in detail the items which the police were authorized to search for and to seize. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S., at 236, 103 S.Ct., at 2331; United States v. Ventresca, supra, 380 U.S., at 108-109, 85 S.Ct., at 745-746.
The Court held in United States v. Johnson that a construction of the Fourth Amendment that did not constitute a "clear break with the past" is to be applied to all convictions not yet final when the decision was handed down. This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. Unlike the Germans of the 1930's and early '40's, we cannot say 'it is all The Leader's doing. On the contrary, we deal here only with the remedy to be applied to a concededly unconstitutional search. 2248, 2259-2260, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); United States v. Ceccolini, supra, 435 U.S., at 279, 98 S.Ct., at 1061.7 In short, the "dissipation of the taint" concept that the Court has applied in deciding whether exclusion is appropriate in a particular case "attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost." 11, 78 L.Ed. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.22. When the principles we have enunciated today are applied to the facts of this case, it is apparent that the judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot stand. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965).10 The propriety of retroactive application of a newly announced Fourth Amendment principle, moreover, has been assessed largely in terms of the contribution retroactivity might make to the deterrence of police misconduct. But when the Court goes beyond what is necessary to decide the case before it, it can only encourage the perception that it is pursuing its own notions of wise social policy, rather than adhering to its judicial role. Notwithstanding the force of the Weeks doctrine that the Fourth Amendment required exclusion, a state court was free to admit illegally seized evidence, according to the Court in Wolf, so long as the State had devised some other "effective" means of vindicating a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. While the Roberts Court has tended to increase the scope of individual privacy, it has also indicated a strong likelihood to rule in favor of law enforcement and the state once a suspect has already been arrested. In view of the modification of the exclusionary rule, the Court of Appeals' judgment cannot stand in this case. . We have held, however, that the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not yet declared unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and seizures without probable cause or search warrants. The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.". I find, then, that there is no probable cause in this case for the issuance of the search warrant. "Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently are guilty. The exclusion of probative evidence in order to serve some other policy is by no means unique to the Fourth Amendment. See also Stewart, 83 Colum.L.Rev., at 1403. Because these deficiencies had not been cured by the police investigation, the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of the search. Stripped of the authority of the warrant, the conduct of these officers was plainly unconstitutional—it amounted to nothing less than a naked invasion of the privacy of respondents' homes without the requisite justification demanded by the Fourth Amendment. See also Ervin, The Exclusionary Rule: An Essential Ingredient of the Fourth Amendment, 1983 S.Ct.Rev. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560-563, 99 S.Ct. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 485-486, 96 S.Ct., at 3048-3049. If the GAO data are restated as a percentage of all arrests, the study shows that only 0.2% of all felony arrests are declined for prosecution because of potential exclusionary rule problems. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form a words. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 221, 99 S.Ct. The key to the Court's conclusion in this respect is its belief that the prospective deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule operates only in those situations in which police officers, when deciding whether to go forward with some particular search, have reason to know that their planned conduct will violate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Rather than seeking to give effect to the liberties secured by the Fourth Amendment through guesswork about deterrence, the Court should restore to its proper place the principle framed 70 years ago in Weeks that an individual whose privacy has been invaded in violation of the Fourth Amendment has a right grounded in that Amendment to prevent the government from subsequently making use of any evidence so obtained. 248, 71 L.Ed. T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 41 (1969). See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 301-303, 104 S.Ct.

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S., at 69, 70 S.Ct., at 436 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 1399 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).40. ." 430, 436-437, 94 L.Ed. The majority ignores the fundamental constitutional importance of what is at stake here. Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S., at 111, 84 S.Ct., at 1512. . 946, 67 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981). Illinois argued that because the police officer acted in good faith, the evidence was admissible. "Some details given tended to corroborate, maybe, the reliability of [the informant's] information about the previous transaction, but if it is not a stale transaction, it comes awfully close to it; and all the other material I think is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt. "[T]he general rule [is] that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted."
When considering the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in the prosecution's case in chief, moreover, we have declined to adopt a per se or "but for" rule that would render inadmissible any evidence that came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest. Further testimony about the impact of the Mapp decision can be found in the statement of Deputy Commissioner Reisman: "The Mapp case was a shock to us. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220, 101 S.Ct. 338 U.S., at 31, 69 S.Ct., at 1362. For at least two reasons, the exclusionary rule is a better remedy than a civil action against an offending officer. See Davies, 1983 A.B.F.Res.J., at 619.

For a thoughtful examination of this point, see Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn.L.Rev. To the contrary, they now will be tested in the real world of state and federal law enforcement, and this Court will attend to the results. Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct.

Armed with the assurance provided by today's decisions that evidence will always be admissible whenever an officer has "reasonably" relied upon a warrant, police departments will be encouraged to train officers that if a warrant has simply been signed, it is reasonable, without more, to rely on it. Id., at 491, 96 S.Ct., at 3051. See also Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duke L.J. 414 U.S., at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620. It is the loss of that evidence that is the "price" our society pays for enjoying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 127. As we said in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. Pp. Decisions made in this manner are unlikely to withstand the test of time. The extent of this Court's fidelity to Fourth Amendment requirements, however, should not turn on such statistical uncertainties. 2041, 2065-2070, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring); California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 100 S.Ct. A recent National Institute of Justice study based on data for the 4-year period 1976-1979 gathered by the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics showed that 4.8% of all cases that were declined for prosecution by California prosecutors were rejected because of illegally seized evidence. . That law also required anyone with a license to allow police to inspect their records at any time without a warrant. If a magistrate serves merely as a "rubber stamp" for the police or is unable to exercise mature judgment, closer supervision or removal provides a more effective remedy than the exclusionary rule. 2085, 2087-2088, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) (per curiam); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S., at 236, 103 S.Ct., at 2331; United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 577-583, 91 S.Ct. The trial court granted Krull’s motion. 3405, 3411, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances.

Although the modification finds strong support in our previous cases, the Court of Appeals' commendable self-restraint is not to be criticized. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. . 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 483, 78 S.Ct. It is clear, first, that the deference accorded to a magistrate's finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that determination was based.

414 U.S., at 354, 94 S.Ct., at 623 (emphasis added); see also ante, at 906. 3037, 3047, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443, n. 12, 96 S.Ct.

In a just society those who govern, as well as those who are governed, must obey the law. Id., at 834, 95 S.Ct., at 2540. App. Like all courts, we face institutional limitations on our ability to gather information about "legislative facts," and the exclusionary rule itself has exacerbated the shortage of hard data concerning the behavior of police officers in the absence of such a rule. Although the Court's opinion tends to overlook this fact, the requirement of particularity is not a mere "technicality," it is an express constitutional command. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. This view of the scope of the Amendment relegates the judiciary to the periphery. 2034, 2039-2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Under such circumstances well-trained professionals must know that they are violating the Constitution. In Gates, the Court held that "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, .

Id., at 391-392, 40 S.Ct., at 182-183 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 2439, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980).


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