See n. 4, supra. Cf. This is what the District Judge in the case drew from the record before him as to the consequences of Detroit's de jure system, and we cannot conclude that the remedies decreed exceeded the scope of the violations found. 391 But at one point there were serious second thoughts. Id., at 746. . More precisely, the burden of state officials is that set forth to Pet. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. (1976), or if they are imposed upon governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected by the constitutional violation, as in Milliken I, supra. Footnote 2 (c) Testing. ] The fourth component, a remedial reading and communications skills program, was proposed later and was endorsed by the Bradley respondents in a critique of the Detroit Board's proposed plan. This case simply does not involve individual citizens' conducting a raid on the state treasury for an accrued monetary liability. U.S. 445

5 (d) Counseling and Career Guidance. We granted certiorari in this case to consider two questions concerning the remedial powers of federal district courts in school desegregation cases, namely, whether a District Court can, as part of a desegregation decree, order compensatory or remedial educational programs for schoolchildren who have been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation, and whether, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court can require state officials found responsible for constitutional violations to bear part of the costs of those programs. In those circumstances an interdistrict remedy would be an appropriate remedy for the Court to consider to eliminate the interdistrict segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation. . But it is not an interest that is related, except fortuitously, to a claim that the desegregation remedy may have exceeded the extent of the violations. (Emphasis supplied. App.

Id., at 231-232. [433 It contends that there has been no finding of a constitutional violation with respect to the past operation of any of these programs, and it insists that without more specifically focused findings of this sort, the decree exceeded the court's powers. In pertinent part, the dissent reads as follows. deals with faculty and staff desegregation, a goal that we have recognized to be an important aspect of the basic task of achieving a public school system wholly free from racial discrimination." for Cert. U.S. 990, 991 of Education v. Spangler, [ Id., at 668. . We reversed, holding that the order exceeded appropriate limits of federal equitable authority as defined in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,

Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select. These specific educational remedies, although normally left to the discretion of the elected school board and professional educators, were deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have enjoyed in terms of education had these four components been provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system free from pervasive de jure racial segregation.

I therefore concur in the judgment.

[

Nor do we find any other reason to believe that the broad and flexible equity powers of the court were abused in this case.

. MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.

Conversely, the Court held that the suit was proper to the extent it sought "payment of state funds .

[ (1969), the Court concerned itself not with pupil assignment, but with the desegregation of faculty and staff as part of the process of dismantling a dual On that view of the record, our settled doctrine requiring that the remedy be carefully tailored to fit identified constitutional violations is reaffirmed by today's result. Hills v. Gautreaux,   U.S. 267, 295]. That the academic development of black children has been impaired by this wrongdoing is to be expected. U.S. 1, 40 1264 (WD Tex. Academic Content. In Brown II the Court squarely held that "[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems . 429 . [433 On August 18, 1970, the NAACP filed suit against Michigan state officials, including then-Gov. [ to Pet. U.S., at 738 -42 (1973); National League of Cities v. Usery, The Bradley respondents claimed more generally that the Board's plan failed to inform the court of the then-current extent of such programs or components in the school system and that the plan failed to assess "the relatedness of the particular component to desegregation.". Cf. U.S., at 753

. 402

In its brief in the Court of Appeals, the Board expressed grave concern as to what the District Court's assumption of the Board's powers could do to the school system financially: [ 139a-144a. 139a-141a. 75a; (ii) a new curriculum for the vocational education courses in the Detroit schools, including the requirement that an additional "grade 13" be added to afford expanded educational opportunities, 402 F. In the absence of Mr. Justice Douglas, I announce on his behalf a dissenting opinion that he has filed. . (Emphasis supplied.) Hi there, would you like to get such a paper? [433 In further refining the remedial process, a unanimous court held in Swann against Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education in 1971 that the task is to correct the condition that offends the Constitution. -294 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, U.S., at 656 No.

U.S. 430, 439 [433 .

All rights reserved. The Board's plan, which the District Court found infirm because of an impermissible use of "arbitrary" racial quotas, contemplated achieving a 40%-60% representation of Negro students in the identifiably white schools, while leaving untouched in terms of pupil reassignment schools in three of the Detroit system's eight regions. The Board's plan also called for the following "educational components": school-community relations, parental involvement, student rights and responsibilities, accountability, curriculum design, bilingual education, multiethnic curriculum, and curricular activities. constitutional principles" in the local setting, Brown v. Board of Education,   Both courts proceeded on an assumption that the Detroit schools could not be desegregated, in their view of what constituted desegregation, unless the racial composition of the student body of each school substantially reflected the racial composition of the population of the metropolitan area as a whole. [ Indeed it was based on a standard which specially said was improper in the Swann case only three years ago. The Court's opinion addresses this case as if it were conventional desegregation litigation. ] In denying the stay application, Mr. Justice Black was untroubled by the underlying order of the District Court: [ The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore. 426 76-447 Argued: March 22, 1977 Decided: June 27, 1977. 418 2, Due to the intervening death of Judge Stephen J. Roth, who had presided over the litigation from the outset, the case on remand was reassigned to Judge Robert E. DeMascio.

1973), rev'd in part on other issues, 495 F.2d 499 (CA5 1974). ] The Court of Appeals disapproved, however, of the District Court's failure to include three of Detroit's eight regions in the pupil assignment plan. . 1096, 1106-1107 (1975).

U.S. 267, 270]. Footnote 23 1096; 411 F. Supp. fund them without requiring financial aid from the State. First, it is argued that the order to pay state funds violates the Eleventh Amendment and principles of federalism. United States Supreme Court. John L. Hill, Attorney General, David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas W. Choate, Special Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Texas as amicus curiae.

That of course was the theory on which lawsuit was initially brought and the only subject on which the District Court took any evidence. Footnote 8 (1976). (The details are set forth in the opinions and decrees of August 15, 1975, November 4 and 20, 1975, and May 11, 1976, all of which are reproduced in full in the appendix to the petition for certiorari. The email address cannot be subscribed. 415 As noted in the text, infra, at 296, a compromise was reached as to these centers and the State entered into a stipulation obligating it to share the cost of providing them.
Second, the decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." v. Rodriguez, . Proceeding from these basic principles, we note first that in the District Court the complainants sought a remedy aimed at the condition alleged to offend the Constitution and that condition was just one thing, the segregation within the Detroit City Schools and the Court found that it did exist and that finding is not challenged here. to Pet. The educational components, which the District Court ordered into effect prospectively, are plainly designed to wipe out continuing conditions of inequality produced by the inherently unequal dual school system long maintained by Detroit. (1955) (Brown II).

U.S. 267, 292] [ [ . Id., at 125a. To that end, the approved plan in United States v. Texas required: Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which could, if circumstances warranted, include programs to remedy deficiencies, particularly in reading and communications skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special in-service training for teachers, see, e. g., United States v. Missouri, 523 F.2d 885, 887 (CA8 1975); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, supra, at 110; Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have altered or even suspended testing programs employed by school systems undergoing desegregation. Swann, supra, at 15. Held: BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. The controlling principle consistently expounded in the holdings of this Court is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. Nine months later, on May 11, 1976, the District Court entered its final order. 402 F. Supp. .

Invoking our holding in Milliken I, petitioners claim that, since the constitutional violation found by the District Court was the unlawful segregation of students on the basis of race, the court's decree must be limited to remedying unlawful pupil assignments. After this Court in Milliken v. Bradley, Ante, at 282. Supp., at 1125. .

MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 291. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's order concerning the implementation of and cost sharing for the four educational components.
(Milliken I), determined that an interdistrict remedy for de jure segregation in the Detroit school system exceeded the constitutional violation, and remanded the case for formulation of a decree, the District Court promptly ordered submission of desegregation plans limited to the Detroit school system. FOR ONLY $13.90/PAGE, Oral Argument - February 27, 1974 (Part 1), Oral Argument - February 27, 1974 (Part 2), Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - February 27, 1974 (Part 1) in Milliken v. Bradley, Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - February 27, 1974 (Part 2) in Milliken v. Bradley, ← Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, New York, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley.


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