8 (2001); Minn. Rule Crim. of Commerce, Bureau of Census. He invoked his right to a new trial before a jury in Circuit Court, Ala. Code § 12-12-71 (1995), where he again appeared without a lawyer and was again convicted.
Stat. 1990031 (Ala. Sup. But it makes no sense to transfer the Chief Justice's concerns to unknown and unknowable forms of probation revocation proceedings, which may provide various means of retesting (with assistance of counsel) the validity of the original conviction. Rev. Nichols is further distinguishable for the related reason that the Court there applied a "less exacting" standard "consistent with the traditional understanding of the sentencing process." § 11-2602 (West 2001) guarantees counsel in "all cases where a person faces a loss of liberty and the Constitution or any other law requires the appointment of counsel." Id., at 788-791. He cites figures suggesting that although conditional sentences are commonly imposed, they are rarely activated. Gaps in the misdemeanor defendant's right to appointed counsel in other States that extend protection beyond the Sixth Amendment are similarly slight.
14-25. Most jurisdictions already provide a state-law right to appointed counsel more generous than that afforded by the Federal Constitution, while simultaneously preserving the option of probationary punishment. 4438, 2002 Cal. 1987) (pretrial probation programs "use the fact that an arrest has occurred as a means of identifying defendants in need of treatment or, at least, not in need of criminal prosecution"). The validity or reliability of the underlying conviction is beyond attack. Ante, at 668, n. 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant-respondent LeReed Shelton, convicted of third-degree assault, was sentenced to a jail term of 30 days, which the trial court immediately suspended, placing Shelton on probation for two years. 2002); Ore. Rev. Or is he prohibited from applying the suspended sentence at all? See App.
Once guilt has been established, we noted in Nichols, sentencing courts may take into account not only "a defendant's prior convictions, but ... also [his] past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior." All but 16 States, for example, would provide counsel to a defendant in Shelton's circumstances, either because he received a substantial fine7 or because state law authorized incarceration for the charged offense8 or provided for a maximum prison term of one year.9 See Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-22, 13A-5-7(a)(1), 13A-5-12(a)(1) (1994). 6; similarly, Alabama maintains, probation uncoupled from a prison sentence should trigger no immediate right to appointed counsel. Thus, nothing in Texas law assures counsel in a misdemeanor bench trial resulting in a suspended sentence. Proc. Seen as a freestanding sentence, Alabama further asserts, probation could be enforced, as a criminal fine or restitution order could, in a contempt proceeding. App. * A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Texas et al. 672-674.
That burden consists not only of the cost of providing state-paid counsel in cases of such insignificance that even financially prosperous defendants sometimes forgo the expense of hired counsel; but also the cost of enabling courts and prosecutors to respond to the "over-lawyering" of minor cases. Today's decision ignores this long and consistent jurisprudence, extending the misdemeanor right to counsel to cases bearing the mere threat of imprisonment. Rather, the critical point was that the defendant had a recognized right to counsel when adjudicated guilty of the felony offense for which he was imprisoned. 2d, at 341 ("All that is required in a hearing of this character is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has violated a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended." See N. J. Stat. A suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction.
Pp. Proc. Brief for Respondent 27-31. The District of Columbia must also be numbered among the jurisdictions whose law is altered by today's decision. Far from supporting amicus' position, Gagnon and Nichols simply highlight that the Sixth Amendment inquiry trains on the stage of the proceedings corresponding to Shelton's Circuit Court trial, where his guilt was adjudicated, eligibility for imprisonment established, and prison sentence determined. See Reply Brief 11-12; Reply Brief to Amicus Curiae Professor Charles Fried 10-13; Tr. Over against the Court's uninformed intuition, there is an amicus brief filed by States that include 2 of the 10 with exceptions that the Court calls "narrow," affirming that the rule the Court has adopted today will impose "significant burdens on States." More typical of the situation that results in a suspended sentence, we think, is a case like Shelton's — a prosecution before a jury for third-degree assault, arising out of a fistfight that followed a minor traffic accident, see App. In Pennsylvania, for example, all defendants charged with misdemeanors enjoy a right to counsel regardless of the sentence imposed, Pa. Rule Crim. 1972), at which the defendant has no right to counsel, and the court no obligation to observe customary rules of evidence, Martin v. State, 46 Ala. App. Reply Brief 4-13. Justice Maddox also construed the trial record as establishing Shelton's waiver of any right to appointed counsel he might have enjoyed. We held that counsel was not invariably required in parole or probation revocation proceedings; we directed, instead, a "case-by-case approach" turning on the character of the issues involved.
App. 2d 202, 205 (Crim. That relaxed standard has no application here, where the question is whether the defendant may be jailed absent a conviction credited as reliable because the defendant had access to counsel. Proc. But in fact there is nothing but the Court's implausible speculation to support the proposition that pretrial probation will "yiel[d] a similar result," ante, at 671.
Id., at 749. 37 (quoting United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648, 654 (CAlO 1991)). Under state statute, he faced a maximum of one year in jail plus a $2,000 fine if he was convicted. Re-, Our prior opinions placed considerable weight on the practical consequences of expanding the right to appointed counsel beyond cases of actual imprisonment. 26.04(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. § 106(c)(2) (1998)) may receive a suspended sentence uncounseled. Over against the Court's uninformed intuition, there is an amicus brief. Although the Court at one point purports to limit its decision to suspended sentences imposed on uncounseled misdemeanants in States, like Alabama, that offer only "minimal procedures" during probation revocation hearings, see ante, at 668, n. 5, the text of today's opinion repudiates that limitation. 2002); 18 Pa. Cons. See State's Brief and Argument on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, p. 31, and State's Brief and Argument in Support of its Application for Rehearing, in No. With so many jurisdictions applying the right to counsel in exactly this fashion, including municipal courts operating well off of the radar of state-level policymakers, it was critical that the Supreme Court address this scenario as well. Stat. Const., Art. The Court quotes Chief Justice Burger's concurrence inArgersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), to support its "doubt that providing counsel after the critical guilt adjudication stage `[would] be of much help to a defendant,' for `the die is usually cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial record.' § 2A:158A-5.2 (1985); Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N. J. Indeed it did not, and that was precisely its error.
Defendant-respondent Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. In Gagnon, the question was whether the defendant, who was placed on probation pursuant to a suspended sentence for armed robbery, had a due process right to representation by appointed counsel at a probation revocation hearing. This system reserves the appointed-counsel requirement for the few cases in which incarceration proves necessary, see Gagnon, 411 U. S., at 784, while respecting the constitutional imperative that no person be imprisoned unless he was represented by counsel, Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 37. pp. § 967.06 (1998); Wyo. i. (3) Also unpersuasive is amicus' contention that practical considerations weigh against extension of the Sixth Amendment appointedcounsel right to a defendant in Shelton's situation.
§ 7-6-102 (2001). Id., at 741. Stat. Pp.
"[A] large number of misdemeanor convictions take place in police or justice courts which are not courts of record. Only 24 States have announced a rule of this scope.4 Thus, the Court's deci-. This system reserves the appointed-counsel requirement for the few cases in which incarceration proves necessary, see Gagnon, 411 U. S., at 784, while respecting the constitutional imperative that no person be imprisoned unless he was represented by counsel, Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 37. In effect, Alabama invites us to regard two years' probation for Shelton as a separate and independent sentence, which "the State would have the same power to enforce [as] a judgment of a mere fine." If the thesis that it is the "functional equivalent" of post-trial probation were true, we would expect to see pretrial probation used for both major and minor crimes and to see it used in place of, not in addition to, post-trial probation. The Court holds that the suspended sentence violates respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it "may 'end up in the actual deprivation of [respondent's] liberty,'" ante, at 658 (emphasis added), if he someday violates the terms of probation, if a court determines that the violation merits revocation of probation, Ala. Code § 15-22-54(d)(1) (1995), and if the court determines that no other punishment will "adequately protect the community from further criminal activity" or "avoid depreciating the seriousness of the violation," § 15-2254(d)(4). of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18, 26 (1981) (the Court "has refused to extend the right to appointed counsel to include prosecutions which, though criminal, do not result in the defendant's loss of personal liberty" (emphasis added)). Alabama concedes that activation of a suspended sentence results in the imprisonment of an uncounseled defendant "for a term that relates to the original offense" and therefore "crosses the line of 'actual imprisonment'" established in Argersinger and Scott.
I, § 13; Mass. See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court 11-18. Stat. But that question is not before us now. In the future, if and when the State of Alabama seeks to imprison respondent on the previously suspended sentence, we can ask whether the procedural safeguards attending the imposition of that sentence comply with the Constitution. Absent any prior presentation of the novel position the State now takes, this Court resists passing on it in the first instance. Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 41." Absent any prior presentation of the position the State now takes,13 we resist passing on it in the first instance. Because Shelton remained on probation, the court held that he had not been denied any Sixth Amendment right at trial. The dispositive factor in Gagnon and Nichols was not whether incarceration occurred immediately or only after some delay. See. Defendant-respondent Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. Far from. William H. Mills argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.